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Abstract. RV-Android is a new freely available open source runtime
library for monitoring formal safety properties on Android. RV-Android
uses the commercial RV-Monitor technology as its core monitoring li-
brary generation technology, allowing for the verification of safety prop-
erties during execution and operating entirely in userspace with no ker-
nel or operating system modifications required. RV-Android improves on
previous Android monitoring work by replacing the JavaMOP framework
with RV-Monitor, a more advanced monitoring library generation tool
with core algorithmic improvements that greatly improve resource con-
sumption, e ciency, and battery life considerations. We demonstrate the
developer usage of RV-Android with the standard Android build process,
using instrumentation mechanisms e↵ective on both Android binaries
and source code. Our method allows for both property development and
advanced application testing through runtime verification. We showcase
the user frontend of RV-Monitor, which is available for public demo use
and requires no knowledge of RV concepts. We explore the extra expres-
siveness the MOP paradigm provides over simply writing properties as
aspects through two sample security properties, and show an example of
a real security violation mitigated by RV-Android on-device. Lastly, we
propose RV as an extension to the next-generation Android permissions
system debuting in Android M.
1 Introduction
With the rise in popularity of Android [1], a Linux-based consumer smartphone
operating system, the need for e↵ective techniques to improve the security and
reliability of third-party applications running on end user devices is well estab-
lished [2]. One solution explored by previous work in the field is the use of run-
time verification and runtime enforcement to detect and recover from violations
of formal safety properties during the execution of Android applications [2] [3].
Some previous work in this space has relied on using kernel modifications to the
Linux base of Android to generate the runtime traces required to verify safety
properties [3] [4]. This solution is inflexible for several reasons: it requires root
access to the device to install, requires reinstallation on each operating system
upgrade, and provides few additional guarantees from a compromised kernel over
a userspace monitoring solution.
Other RV-based Android work has used JavaMOP, an experimental moni-
tor oriented programming framework, to generate Android monitoring libraries
which are weaved into third-party userspace applications, providing monitoring
functionality and guarantees without requiring kernel-level modifications [2].
This approach has been demonstrated using AspectJ [5] for weaving, and
allows us to weave binary bytecode useful towards instrumenting o↵-the-shelf
third party packaged applications (apk’s) [2] [4]. Our work focuses on improv-
ing these approaches with e cient and versatile runtime verification tools that
benefit from the previous research endeavors related to JavaMOP, resulting in
a unified and open framework for runtime verification and analysis of Android
applications.
1.1 Contributions
RV-Monitor is a proprietary library generation technology, allowing for the run-
time monitoring, verification, and enforcement of safety properties through the
generation of generic monitoring libraries. RV-Monitor is provided free for non-
commerical use, and represents the evolution of the prototype JavaMOP tools
with improvements in the codebase and core algorithms. Like JavaMOP, RV-
Monitor supports logic plugins, allowing for the specifications of properties in
multiple formalisms including regular expressions, context-free grammars, au-
tomata, and past-time linear temporal logic.
We make the case for the future use of RV-Monitor and its related Android
runtime library for use in runtime verification and runtime enforcement of An-
droid applications. We compare monitor-oriented programming techniques to
popular aspect-oriented techniques, acknowledging the usefulness of both and
supporting both as property inputs to our tools. We analyze a real security
violation on the Android platform with the potential to be stopped by monitor-
oriented programming, including the relevant property with our tool’s distribu-
tion. Lastly, we discuss the future of RV on the Android platform and lay out a
roadmap for future industry-lead work in the space.
2 RV-Android Overview and Build Process
RV-Android consists of two components, a monitoring library generation tool
and a runtime environment used in the generation of these libraries for dynamic
on-device property monitoring and violation recovery. For the first of these RV-
Monitor is used o↵-the-shelf, allowing for the specification of both formal prop-
erties over events and the instrumentation points for these events in a single
monitor-oriented file. This monitor-oriented programming is achieved through a
new version of JavaMOP, a lightweight compiler that generates RV-Monitor
(monitoring library) and AspectJ (program instrumentation) output. Unlike
versions of JavaMOP used in previous work, which were fully responsible for
monitoring applications and did not leverage RV-Monitor, this next-generation
JavaMOP stands to benefit from the significant core algorithmic improvements
that form the basis of the RV-Monitor IP [6] while completely separating the
generation of e cient monitoring libraries from application instrumentation.
In our work, we will separate the discussion on instrumentation from the dis-
cussion on event and property definitions. We do this to leave open the possibility
of future instrumentation models. While we focus on instrumentation methods
using AspectJ in this work, other instrumentation mechanisms for packaged An-
droid binaries have already been e↵ectively demonstrated and proved [2,4,7,8].
RV-Monitor is compatible with any Java instrumentation method, and the Java-
MOP project can be extended to generate the required input for other instru-
mentation tools if necessary.
Our website, http://runtimeverification.com/android, provides down-
loads and full instructions for the use of RV-Android, as well as the examples we
discuss in the remainder of the paper and a video demonstrating a few currently
available capabilities of the tool.
2.1 Build Process
Fig. 1: RV-Android Build Process
The RV-Android process (shown above in Figure 1) forms the basis of all tools
based on RV-Android. Taking either a binary packaged Android application or
set of source files as input, RV-Android additionally optionally takes any (or
all) of aspect files, RV-Monitor properties, and monitor-oriented programming
(MOP) files compatible with the JavaMOP tool. This flexibility in input allows
RV-Monitor to be used with a wide variety of property formats, including aspect-
oriented AspectJ properties that do not require formalisms or the additional
features provided by RV-Monitor or JavaMOP.
By being able to mix and bundle these diverse formats together into a single
set of properties as input to a single tool, property developers and application
developers have an easy way to develop, apply, and share dynamic properties of
their choice without the need to constrain themselves to a single tool. Futher-
more, property developers have the ultimate control over the instrumentation
of their properties in the original application: they can choose to use AspectJ
directly, use MOP, or use other techniques of manual instrumentation. In doing
so, the goal is to create a platform in which all developers of runtime proper-
ties for the Android platform feel comfortable using their preferred technologies,
encouraging third-party property development.
RV-Monitor also features a flexible plugin architecture that allows for the
development of custom or third-party formalisms supported by the tool, allow-
ing virtually unlimited expressiveness in the properties it defines. By combining
this with instrumentation in a single monitor-oriented programming files, ad-
vanced developers can write complex properties succinctly while defining simple
properties not requiring dedicated formalisms in native Java directly through
AspectJ.
RV-Android is also an open source project built around the closed source
RV-Monitor project, but can be used without RV-Monitor as an aspect oriented
programming platform, as well as extended to work with any number of tools
supporting Java transformation and analysis. Because it is open source, RV-
Android can also be extended by other tool developers who provide runtime
analysis and verification of applications to integrate any technique into its work-
flow. We are already developing prototype extensions for taint analysis and other
popular dynamic analysis techniques, extending the capabilities of RV-Android
beyond the capabilities of any single tool.
Figure 1 shows the output of RV-Android as a signed, packaged Android
application to be distributed to users. By signing all verified and monitored
applications with an ”RV” key from a source trusted by the user, the user’s
smartphone can then verify that the application has been correctly monitored
and transformed to the specifications provided as input to the tool.
Excluded from the figure is the inclusion of the AspectJ and RV-Monitor
runtimes in the monitored and instrumented application. These runtimes are
needed for the instrumentation and monitoring of the application on-device,
and are simply the binary runtimes as provided by each project.
2.2 RV-Android for Developers
In order to provide a full framework for runtime verification and enforcement on
the Android platform, we must allow developers to complete their two primary
tasks of interest with regards to runtime verification: developing new properties
to check on their applications and third-party applications, and checking their
own applications against existing property sets. To do this, we provide two ver-
sions of RV-Android for developers, targeted at two possible use cases. The first
allows developers to integrate RV-Android into projects where they are using
the standard Android build process and have access to the source code of the
application, instrumenting source code directly. The second version is able to
monitor properties of binary Android applications, or apks, and can be used on
any application that runs on the Android platform.
Monitoring Source Code To monitor source code, we provide a version of
RV-Android called the “developer source” edition. Found in the “developer src”
subdirectory of the RV-Android distribution, this edition requires the developer
to create two directories, “aspects” and “properties”. By placing AspectJ files
and RV-Monitor or MOP properties in the relevant directories and following
the remainder of the setup instructions for the source edition, developers can
integrate monitors and runtime verification in their build and testing process
with no modification required to the source of the application itself.
This provides a convenient way for developers interested in obtaining the
maximum assurance from their Android applications to leverage runtime veri-
fication. Additionally, developers using the default Android build process who
wish to ship monitors integrated with their final application to end users (for
assurance, security, or enforcement purposes) can use this version to monitor
their source directly, requiring no binary transformations.
Monitoring Binary APKs The second and more flexible distribution of RV-
Android for developers focuses on monitoring arbitrary binary Android applica-
tions, and is referred to as the “command line” distribution. This distribution
can also be used by advanced users who are comfortable using command-line
tools. Similarly to the previous application, the tool takes both properties and
aspects, and has a simple command-line interface with parameters as follows:
./rv_android [apk] [keystore] [keystore password]
[signing key alias] [monitors_directory] [aspects_directory]
Because of its simplicity and extensibility, this version of RV-Android can be
integrated into any environment or build process. We recommend this version
to all new developers interested in RV on Android.
2.3 RV-Android for End Users - GUI Frontend
For end-users who are not familiar with command-line applications and property
development, but still wish to gain some additional assurance in or control over
Fig. 2: RV-Android On-Device Architecture
Fig. 3: RV-Android Screenshots, Application and Property Selection
their applications, we provided a GUI version of RV-Android. The architecture
of this system is shown in Figure 2. RV-Android runs entirely on a remote server
in the cloud, which runs the same CLI version of RV-Android with the workflow
in Figure 1. The program on the user’s device is simply a shell allowing them
to manage and select properties, and select an application on their device to
instrument. This is similar to previous approaches applied to runtime verification
on Android [9].
Through this graphical user interface, we allow users that may be completely
unfamiliar with RV or its concepts to apply generic “properties” to any of the
applications currently on their device. We also allow them to download third-
party sets of properties and read their descriptions.
Such an application aims to bring RV to the mainstream by providing sim-
ple, human-readable descriptions of what each property does or checks for and
allowing any property to be used with any userspace application on any Android
smartphone, without requiring root access. In the user frontend, there is no dis-
tinction made between properties written as aspects, monitors, or other formats,
all of which are simply referred to as “properties”.
We believe such a platform is an ideal introduction point to runtime verifi-
cation for users and developers alike. With the increased importance of security
on mobile devices, which often carry personal information and other sensitive
data [10] [11], and the ability to instrument any arbitrary binary Android appli-
cation by virtue of the Java bytecode format used, we are able to show o↵ the
powerful and generic nature of runtime verification technology in an environment
becoming increasingly important to end users.
Figure 3 shows two screenshots of the RV-Android frontend for end-users,
currently in beta. Users select an application followed by a set of properties to
apply to the application, with the remainder of the process being automated.
These properties have extended descriptions that can be viewed by the user, and
can be extended to include custom or user-defined properties. Applications can
also be filtered by those requesting a set of permissions considered by the user
to be particularly sensitive.
3 Towards Practicality - RV-Android Case Studies
Having presented the overall architecture and currently available distributions
of the RV-Android tool, the question of whether such techniques are practical
and cost e↵ective for use on real applications and devices arises naturally. The
practicality of the tools presented hinges on the ability to develop a useful set
of properties supported by the tool, which can then be shared, packaged, and
distributed to end users for monitoring of arbitrary applications on-device or
used by developers to test and evaluate their applications against the given set
of API rules, coding best practices, and security properties.
To address the matter of usable properties, we will first consider the ideal
language for expressing properties. Because RV-Monitor supports a variety of
techniques for writing properties, including raw aspect-oriented properties and
monitor-oriented properties that define both formal mathematical properties and
their instrumentation, it is important to note the drawbacks and advantages of
both techniques.
3.1 Two Properties in MOP and AspectJ
Blocking Device Location and Network Accesses The first property is a
security property intended to block malicious or questionably-sourced applica-
tions from accessing a user’s location through the Android location API. The
second property is not security oriented as the first one is. Instead, it merely
logs and notifies the user when an application attempts to use an Android API
call related to networking and connections to the Internet.
The Properties in AspectJ We present how to implement monitors for the
two properties in AspectJ. Note, the monitors make use of the following im-
ports: import android.app.Activity; import android.content.Context; import android.
content.ContextWrapper; import android.widget.Toast;
The monitor for blocking the device location is shown in full in aspect form
in Listing 1.1. It prints a message to the user and log noting the attempted
location access, and denies the access by returning null to the aspect around() join
point rather than proceeding with the original call. It is clear from examining
the property that there is a lot of code that can be automatically generated,
including the code required to track the current activity in order to show the
notification to the user.
The monitor for keeping track of network accesses is shown in full in aspect
form in Listing 1.2. The monitor does not attempt to preserve any security
properties (such as an unknown application cannot access user location). Instead,
it merely logs and notifies the user when an application attempts to use an
Android API call related to networking and connections to the Internet.
The monitors for these properties share a large amount of code, which is
expected as both are fundamentally performing the same task (notifying the
user of some event occurring on the device). This also suggests that there is
a significant potential for automatically generating the monitor, and that both
monitors could be expressed more concisely.
The Properties in MOP While aspect-oriented programming is one approach
to monitoring and analyzing applications on the Android platform [4], a newer
paradigm familiar to the runtime verification community involves using the
monitoring-oriented programming paradigm. Listing 1.3 shows the same prop-
erty being enforced as in Listing 1.1 with a monitor defined with significantly less
code. Using several keywords provided by RV-Monitor and RV-Android, partic-
ularly TOAST and SKIP, which in addition to ACTIVITY form the basic
keywords for user interaction currently supported by RV-Monitor, we automat-
ically generate much of the code performing similar functions to the previous
monitors in AspectJ.
1 aspect BlockGetLocation extends Act i v i ty {
2
3 pr i va t e ContextWrapper contextWrapper ;
4 pr i va t e Act i v i ty a c t i v i t y ;
5 pr i va t e Object ob j e c t ;
6
7 Object around ( ) : c a l l (⇤ android . l o c a t i o n . . ⇤ ( . . ) )
8 && ! with in ( BlockGetLocation )
9 {
10 St r ing method = th i s Jo inPo in t . ge tS ignature ( ) . getName ( ) ;
11 St r ing c l a s s e = th i s Jo inPo in t . ge tS ignature ( ) . getDeclar ingType ( ) .
getName ( ) ;
12 /⇤ Log in fo rmat ion about method and c l a s s ⇤/ ;
13 Object ob j e c t = th i s Jo inPo in t . getThis ( ) ;
14 Toast . makeText (
15 ( ( android . content . ContextWrapper ) ob j e c t ) .
getAppl i cat ionContext ( ) ,
16 ”Appl i ca t ion a c c e s s i n g l o c a t i o n in fo rmat ion ” , Toast .
LENGTH LONG) . show ( ) ;
17 re turn nu l l ;
18 }
19
20 // Advice to get the context app l i c a t i on
21 a f t e r ( ) : execut ion ( void Act iv i ty . onCreate ( . . ) )
22 && ! with in ( BlockGetLocation ) {
23 t ry {
24 a c t i v i t y = new Act iv i ty ( ) ;
25 ob j e c t = th i s Jo inPo in t . getThis ( ) ;
26 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ( ob j e c t i n s t an c e o f Ac t i v i ty ) ) ;
27 contextWrapper = new ContextWrapper (
28 ( ( android . content . ContextWrapper ) ob j e c t )
29 . getAppl i cat ionContext ( ) ) ;
30 } catch ( Exception e ) {
31 System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( e . t oS t r i ng ( ) ) ;
32 }
33 }
34 }
Listing 1.1: Aspect-Oriented Property Blocking Location Accesses
Similarly, Listing 1.4 shows the same monitor as in Listing 1.2 using MOP
format. Some clear advantages include shorter property that is easier to write,
debug, and validate for developers and even advanced end-users.
Neither of these properties, however, leverage the primary feature of RV-
Monitor, which is the ability to define logical properties over the event trace of
an application in a variety of formalisms.
One example of using such formalisms is shown in Listing 1.5, which combines
the previous two properties by denying all network-related API calls after the
user’s location is accessed. The access is otherwise permitted by the system.
The property is formally defined by a finite state machine in which the first
state is safe, as the application has not accessed any location information. The
application accessing any location information brings it to an unsafe state, after
which any network access lead to a ”denied” state. On entering the denied state,
the monitor skips the function call to the network, returning null rather than
executing that call. The distinction between the unsafe and deny states is that
1 aspect WebAspect extends Act i v i ty {
2 // Android In t e rn e t methods
3 po intcut webCall ( ) : c a l l (⇤ android . net . . ⇤ ( . . ) ) | | c a l l (⇤ android .
webkit .WebView . . ⇤ ( . . ) ) | | c a l l (⇤ java . net . HttpURLConnection . . ⇤ ( . . )
) && ! with in (WebAspect ) ;
4 po intcut onCreate ( ) : execut ion (⇤ onCreate ( . . ) ) && ! with in (WebAspect ) ;
5
6 pr i va t e ContextWrapper contextWrapper ;
7 pr i va t e Act i v i ty a c t i v i t y ;
8 i n t count ;
9 a f t e r ( ) : webCall ( ) {
10 t ry {
11 i f ( count == 0){
12 i f ( contextWrapper != nu l l && a c t i v i t y != nu l l && count==0){
13 a c t i v i t y . runOnUiThread (new Runnable ( ) {
14 pub l i c void run ( ) {
15 count++;
16 // Toast message to inform
17 Toast . makeText ( contextWrapper . getAppl i cat ionContext ( ) ,
18 ”Appl i ca t ion a c c e s s i n g to In t e rn e t ” , Toast .LENGTH LONG) . show ( )
;
19 }
20 }) ;
21 }
22 e l s e { /⇤ Log e r r o r about the miss ing context app l i c a t i on ⇤/ }
23 }
24 } catch ( Exception e ){
25 /⇤ Log except ion us ing th i s Jo inPo in t . getTarget ( ) . t oS t r i ng ( ) ⇤/
26 }
27 }
28 // Advice to get the context app l i c a t i on
29 a f t e r ( ) : onCreate ( ) {
30 t ry {
31 count=0;
32 a c t i v i t y = new Act iv i ty ( ) ;
33 Object ob j e c t = th i s Jo inPo in t . getThis ( ) ;
34 contextWrapper = new ContextWrapper ( ( ( android . content .
ContextWrapper ) ob j e c t ) . getAppl i cat ionContext ( ) ) ;
35 } catch ( Exception e ) { /⇤ Log e r r o r message ⇤/ }
36 }
37 }
Listing 1.2: Aspect-Oriented Property Monitoring Network Accesses
the unsafe state does not skip the call, allowing for further location accesses after
the first access, but not for further
Such a property is useful to users concerned about the leakage of their lo-
cation data, though it is not in its current form comprehensive for all possible
data exfiltration channels on Android devices.
In addition to allowing for the addition of logic to Android programming, RV-
Monitor can extremely e ciently monitor parametric properties, or properties
of a specific Java object, class, or memory location and allowing for millions of
monitors to be created with low runtime overhead [6]. This expressiveness and
low overhead makes RV-Monitor ideal for a wide range of properties, from simple
global properties like the above to complex parametric properties.
1 import java . lang . ⇤ ;
2
3 Android DenyLocation ( ) {
4
5 // Deny a l l l o c a t i o n package c a l l s
6 event l o c a t i o n Object around ( ) : c a l l (⇤ android . l o c a t i o n . . ⇤ ( . . ) ) {
7 TOAST(”Appl i cat ion a c c e s s i n g l o c a t i o n in fo rmat ion . ” ) ;
8 SKIP ;
9 }
10 }
Listing 1.3: Monitor-Oriented Property Blocking Location Accesses
1 import java . lang . ⇤ ;
2
3 Android MonitorNetwork ( ) {
4
5 // Display app l i c a t i on toa s t on a l l network API c a l l s
6 event web ca l l a f t e r ( ) : c a l l (⇤ android . net . . ⇤ ( . . ) )
7 | | c a l l (⇤ android . webkit .WebView . . ⇤ ( . . ) )
8 | | c a l l (⇤ java . net . HttpURLConnection . . ⇤ ( . . ) ) {
9 TOAST(”Appl i cat ion a c c e s s i n g the Inte rnet , ” ) ;
10 }
11
12 }
Listing 1.4: Monitor-Oriented Property Monitoring Network Accesses
3.2 Preventing Security Violations - A Real Attack
While the above properties may be useful for users wishing to gain fine grained
control over the privacy of their data when faced with potentially malicious ap-
plications, they are generally ine↵ective in protecting against real attacks. List-
ing 1.6 shows a MOP monitor in blocking a wide range of attacks. Similarly to
the monitors in the previous subsection, this is a simple monitor designed to skip
all calls to any exec method in the Runtime class. This method in the Android
API allows developers to execute shell code directly through the currently run-
ning process, allowing for arbitrary commands interpreted by the Linux kernel
underpinning Android [12].
One potential practical application of this property is the disabling of cur-
rently available Tor libraries, which are becoming widely used on Android in a
malware context [13]. The Tor network allows malware, including spyware, ad-
ware, and ransomeware, to obfuscate its network connections to command and
control servers, the location of which can be hidden from law enforcement and
the public [14]. A 2014 survey of Android security by Google specifically men-
tions ransomware as an up-and-coming problem needing to be addressed by the
Android security team, further suggesting the application of dynamic and static
analysis techniques against spyware and other malicious applications which often
use Tor to communicate with their operators [15,13].
The above property disbales Tor due to the code in Listing 1.7, which needs
to install executable binary blobs of native code. Because there is no native file
1 import java . lang . ⇤ ;
2
3 Android MonitorLocationNetwork ( ) {
4
5 event web ca l l Object around ( ) : c a l l (⇤ android . net . . ⇤ ( . . ) )
6 | | c a l l (⇤ android . webkit .WebView . . ⇤ ( . . ) )
7 | | c a l l (⇤ java . net . HttpURLConnection . . ⇤ ( . . ) ) {
8 TOAST(”Appl i cat ion a c c e s s i n g the Inte rnet , ” ) ;
9 }
10
11 event l o c a t i o n Object around ( ) : c a l l (⇤ android . l o c a t i o n . . ⇤ ( . . ) ) {
12 TOAST(”Appl i cat ion a c c e s s i n g l o c a t i o n in fo rmat ion . ” ) ;
13 }
14
15 fsm :
16 s t a r t [
17 l o c a t i o n  > unsafe
18 web ca l l  > s t a r t
19 ]
20 unsafe [
21 web ca l l  > deny
22 l o c a t i o n  > unsafe
23 ]
24 deny [
25 web ca l l  > deny
26 l o c a t i o n  > unsafe
27 ]
28
29 @deny {
30 SKIP ;
31 }
32
33 }
Listing 1.5: Monitor-Oriented FSM Property Preventing Network Accesses after
Location
permission API on Android, the above aspect blocks all attempts to change file
permissions and thus install native code from any third-party applications. In
doing so, it blocks a wide range of potential attacks and privilege escalation
exploits which rely on shell access, rendering it a powerful practical defense
against violations of user privacy by malware that leverages the Tor network.
To test this property, it is su cient to instrument the “Orbot” application
in the Play store and attempt to run it on-device for the first time. We include
detailed instructions and a sample of such monitored applications on https:
//runtimeverification.com/android, one of which is a sample of real spyware
disabled through the monitoring and enforcement of the above property.
4 Into the Future - Beyond Android Permissions
The future of the Android platform brings a substantial amount of change, with
an ever increasing level of the platform’s popularity and a significant number
of potentially harmful applications still being deployed to user devices regu-
larly [15].
1 import java . lang . ⇤ ;
2
3 Android BlockShel lExec ( ) {
4
5 // Skip a l l s h e l l execut ion c a l l s
6 event s h e l l c a l l Object around ( ) : c a l l (⇤ Runtime+. exec ( . . ) ) {
7 SKIP ;
8 }
9 }
Listing 1.6: Monitor-Oriented Property Blocking Shell Calls
1 pub l i c s t a t i c void copyRawFile ( Context ctx , i n t r e s id , F i l e f i l e , S t r ing
mode , boolean i sZ ipd ) throws IOException , Inter ruptedExcept ion
2 {
3 . . . // Copy f i l e
4 // Change the pe rmi s s i ons
5 Runtime . getRuntime ( ) . exec ( ”chmod ”+mode+” ”+abspath ) . waitFor ( ) ;
6 }
Listing 1.7: Potentially Malicious Code Installing the Tor Network from Orbot
4.1 Android M - A New Permissions Model
One of the most recently announced changes in the fundamental security model
of the Android platform is the change in the permissions system being released
with Android M. Rather than simply granting an application blanket permis-
sion to perform all operations in a given category, application permissions can
be revoked at any time by the user [16]. One example of this is the revocation of
location permissions from applications which may be leaking user data to third
parties. This replaces many of the simpler security properties and aspects pre-
viously written targetting Android permissions, including the location property
presented in this paper.
Despite this, as shown in Listing 1.5, RV-Android can provide much finer
grained control over how permissions are used on device, revoking or grant-
ing permissions dynamically based on logical properties of the application state
or current trace. In this way, context-sensitive permissions become possible for
cases where a high level of control is desirable. One perfect example of this is
the revocation of the Internet permission we discussed, which is now granted
by default and without user confirmation to all applications being installed in
Android M [17]. This change potentially removes some control from the user
related to which applications have network access. However, because almost all
applications rely on network access, context-sensitive permissions in which al-
lowed hosts are whitelisted and certain services (like Tor or known ad networks)
are blacklisted, and in which the level of action reacts to other system events
may be more appropriate for informing the end user and providing them with
ultimate control.
Using runtime verification and monitoring, one can control every category
of permission and API access, specifically defining the access patterns and data
allowed to the application. By defining such specific and tightly controlled execu-
tions, users can notice and prevent malicious or unexpected application behavior.
Such control may be useful for employers with employees dealing with sensitive
data on Android devices, and in all security-sensitive Android applications. The
ability to run third-party applications on such devices introduces security vul-
nerabilities, a wide range of which can be detected and prevented with runtime
verification.
4.2 Integrating with Other Approaches
In addition to preventing security violations as they occur, RV-Android can be
used as a testing tool on a large number of applications to detect the presence of
such violations in third party applications. In doing so, RV-Android can leverage
a number of automated unit testing tools already available for Android designed
to mimic and mock user behavior on the platform [18] [19], checking a large
number of properties automatically.
In addition to testing, RV-Android could potentially integrate with other
dynamic analysis tools, including popular tools designed to ensure data security
through taint analysis. Taint analysis is a popular technique that tracks sensitive
information as it is handled by applications, preventing it from leaving through
any unprivileged API calls or other “sinks” [20] [21]. By integrating many such
techniques, we aim to create the foremost security tool and platform for Android,
with an ability to implement any future dynamic analysis techniques desirable
to users and developers.
Lastly, runtime verification can integrate with static analysis to improve its
e ciency and inform the automatic generation of properties checkable at run-
time [22]. While there are no concrete plans to do so in RV-Android currently,
this remains a future potential research direction.
4.3 Towards a Public Property Database
Undoubtedly the most important work in developing a framework for practical
Android runtime verification is the development of properties that thoroughly
encompass both known misuses of the Android and Java API’s and violations
of secure states by previously observed malware. To this end, we are develop-
ing a property database which provides annotated copies of both the Android
and Java API’s with RV-Monitor properties and AspectJ instrumentation built
in. The current property database can be viewed and downloaded for free at
https://github.com/runtimeverification/property-db/, and can be used
by RV-Android with minimal modification. The property database currently
contains around 180 safety properties of the Java API, which can be practically
simultaneously monitored by our technology. These properties di↵er substan-
tially from the security properties presented in this paper in that they monitor
correct use of the API and thus functionality of the application rather than
attempting to enforce the security of the device itself. This flexibility of RV-
Android in capturing a wide range of potential properties on Android, together
with this robust database of existing properties provides a good starting point for
the development of a comprehensive dynamic analysis and runtime verification
tool.
We further plan on providing additional privacy profiles focused on stronger
security guarantees for the security conscious user, such as profiles useful in
avoiding data exfiltration when using specific API’s. While we will still allow
users to define their own properties, the utility of future iterations of RV-Android
will stem partially from the robustness of the default properties in our property
database.
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